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Governor Sir John Field in St Helena: Democratic Reform in a Small British Colony, 
1962-68 
 
In the age of decolonisation, Whitehall generally accepted the case for political advancement 
even in small British colonies like St Helena judged too lacking in resources to become 
independent states, provided this could be granted without risk to good government. The 
previous experience of Sir John Field in West Africa and his sensitivity to UN expectations 
lay behind the democratic reforms he introduced, which by 1968 had established an elected 
Legislative Council and an Executive Council made up mainly of LegCo members.  But the 
steps he took owed little to sustained popular demand for self-government, as was common 
elsewhere, and much to his determination to make islanders politically more responsible. 
Public engagement was inhibited by practical constraints, local culture, and a discouraging 




On 13 May 1962, Sir John Field boarded the launch which took him and Lady Field from the 
Union-Castle liner anchored in the bay to the wharf at Jamestown to take up his post as 
governor of St Helena in the South Atlantic.1 Since access to the island was only by ship and 
the scheduled passenger service took over two weeks to travel the 4500 miles from the UK, 
he would have had ample time to reflect on his responsibilities and the task ahead. He had 
been made responsible for the well-being and good government of around 4600 people of 
mixed Asian, African, Chinese and European origin, living on an isolated island of just 47 
square miles.2 Six years later, on 25 May 1968, his term of office completed, Sir John and 
Lady Field boarded the Good Hope Castle, bound for Cape Town, for a period of leave 
before returning to London.  This was a shorter journey, just four days, but enough for 
reflections on what he had achieved. ‘I hope I have done some good’, he wrote in his journal, 
‘and I venture to hope that I have been a successful Governor.’ Many on the island thought 
so, and also ministers in London.  Not only had he been awarded a KBE in 1967, but in 1970 
when senior posts in the diminishing Colonial Empire were becoming rare he became 
Resident Commissioner, later Governor, of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. 
 
His achievements included the transformation of St Helena’s constitution.  Field inherited a 
system of government strongly resembling conventional crown colony administration: a 
governor working with an Executive Council responsible for policy-making and 
administration made up of four expatriate officials, to which had been added, but only in 
1956, three non-officials.  These three were selected by the governor from an Advisory 
Council of up to ten members, all appointed by the governor, two of whom were to represent 
the island’s friendly societies and five the district associations which had been formed 
recently in the small settlements around the island.3  The Advisory Council so composed was 
supposed to enable the governor to tap into local opinion, but as its title indicates it had no 
legislative or administrative functions, and it met in private.  By the time Field left, it had 
been transformed into a law-making Legislative Council, meeting in public under the 
presidency of the governor, made up of twelve councillors to be elected in secret ballots by 
registered adult voters in ten constituencies. Only the government secretary and the colonial 
treasurer also attended.  Those elected also became members of six LegCo committees 
responsible for managing important areas of government administration: agriculture and 
natural resources, public works and services, social welfare, public health, and education, 
plus finance to which the chairs of all the other committees automatically belonged.  Except 
for finance, headed by the colonial treasurer, committee chairs were to be elected LegCo 
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members, albeit chosen by the governor.  They also became members of a transformed 
Executive Council, presided over by the governor, which otherwise included only the 
government secretary and the colonial treasurer.4   
 
This was indeed a radical constitutional change, but on the face of it only following, belatedly 
and partially, the early steps towards democratic accountability which post-war had already 
seen the ending of imperial control in south Asia in the late 1940s, over the larger African 
colonies from the late 1950s, and subsequently elsewhere. In explaining the timing of British 
decolonisation, emphasis is usually placed on the pressure from popular nationalist 
movements, as well as - varying erratically over time and from place to place - the inability or 
often the unwillingness of the British government to resist most demands for political change 
and even independence, for financial, economic and political reasons, including a sensitivity 
to American and increasingly United Nations opinion. In February 1946 the UN General 
Assembly had instructed colonial powers to report on economic, social and educational 
conditions in their colonies, and additional demands for political change and decolonisation 
culminated in Resolution 1514 (XV) in December 1960, setting out the acceptable options 
leading to self-determined independence for colonial peoples. Equally important was the 
establishment in 1961, shortly before Sir John Field took office in St Helena, of what came to 
be called the UN’s Committee of Twenty-Four, which monitored progress and insisted on 
more rapid change.5    
 
However, while UN pressures may, at best, have hurried along the ending of formal empire in 
the larger colonies, ministers and officials in London also had to address the question of how 
far and in what direction political change could be allowed or even encouraged in what were 
initially loosely described as the ‘Smaller Colonial Territories’ and when their numbers 
diminished the ‘Remaining British Dependent Territories’.  Whether all independent former 
colonies, irrespective of size, should be accorded equal status if they opted to join the 
Commonwealth was one matter that troubled its initial founder members including the UK 
government,6 but the latter also fretted that several small colonies seemed to lack the size, 
population, natural resources and viable economy they would need in order to function as 
independent states. Nevertheless, even in what were expected to remain dependent territories, 
colonial constitutions might still need amending to increase local involvement in colonial 
government.  But how much demand was there locally for more public participation in the 
government of small colonies, and would an adequate response be more, or more democratic, 
representation on advisory councils or perhaps on executive councils?  Could even internal 
self-government be allowed for colonies which were – and likely to remain – financially 
dependent on UK aid or were of strategic importance?  Was something like a Westminster-
style government really suitable for small communities, or would something akin to a 
municipal authority with specific but limited responsibilities be more suitable? Were best 
options merger or federation with other small or adjacent territories, or a Channel Islands or 
Isle of Man relationship with the UK, or even integration with the UK and parliamentary 
representation in London (seriously considered for a while as an option for Malta and 
Gibraltar)?  Would any partial changes be acceptable to the Committee of Twenty-Four, 
which certainly did not (yet) regard the future of small colonies as marginal to its mission?  
Possibilities and what might be the ultimate political destiny of such territories were therefore 
the subject of a sequence of official explorations, beginning in 1949 with the Committee of 
Enquiry into Constitutional Development in the Smaller Colonial Territories, with several 
more to follow through the 1950s and 1960s.  They had little practical outcome, being 
overtaken by events, but the many papers they generated repeatedly acknowledged the need 
for constitutional changes in small colonies, some time, somehow.7     
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St Helena always figured among the ‘smaller colonial territories’ which were never thought 
likely to become independent,8 and indeed it remains today a lingering legacy of empire, one 
of the dozen or so British Overseas Territories.9  Of course, the way in which St Helena was 
governed had changed since the Crown had taken over responsibility in 1834 after 175 years 
of East India Company rule.  Nevertheless, even by 1962 when Field took charge, the 
constitution had not departed far from autocracy.  There had been sporadic local demands for 
elected representation on the governor’s councils, led by the few major landowners and 
members of the Chamber of Commerce, particularly when protesting against the taxes needed 
to help finance government services.  For this reason, such demands tended to be treated by 
officials as selfish sectional concerns.10 Indeed, it was repeatedly stated by governors and 
accepted by Colonial Office staff that Saints (as the island-born are now commonly called) 
were in general uninterested in constitutional change.  Governor George Joy in 1949 agreed 
with the assessment of his two immediate predecessors that ‘the people’ did not wish to 
become involved in island administration.  ‘Elsewhere the problem is that of yielding 
successive powers to a populace vociferating for self-government.  Here, the problem is that 
of encouraging a diffident people to demand and accept responsibility for their internal 
affairs’. His monthly tea parties with the (unelected) members of his Advisory Council were, 
he reckoned, a quite sufficient innovation.11 
 
To be fair, Joy was concerned about this apparent apathy, and certainly Governor James 
Harford, his successor in 1954, identified this as a problem to be addressed.  In the context of 
the Colonial Office’s wider deliberations on the need for constitutional development in the 
‘smaller colonial territories’, suggestions for change in order to encourage islanders to 
become more involved in the island’s administration were then batted between Harford and 
the Colonial Office for a couple of years until in March 1956 new constitutional instruments 
were issued.  Membership of the Advisory Council was to be increased, and those appointed 
(not elected) were supposed to be more representative of island communities and to arouse 
local interest, but the only substantial change was the selection by the governor of three 
members of this larger Advisory Council to sit also on his Executive Council - and this it 
seems because by then an Executive Council made up entirely of officials was thought to be 
unique in Britain’s colonial empire.  Harford had consulted only current members of his 
Executive and Advisory Councils and of the Chamber of Commerce, and had confidently 
concluded that there was as yet no significant demand for democratic elections.12  Indeed, 
prior to him leaving office in January 1958, there were few signs of that wider political 
interest which constitutional modifications had been intended to encourage.  But then, 




Early in 1958 an expatriate settler contacted the British Labour Party to complain about 
conditions on St Helena and its form of government.  In response and at the request of the 
party leadership, Cledwyn Hughes, MP for Anglesey, visited the island in June-July 1958.  
His report was highly critical of what he found, including the island’s undemocratic 
constitution.  He proposed an Advisory Council of fifteen members, elected by adult suffrage, 
who should also elect six of their number to serve on the Executive Council alongside only 
two officials.13  The mainstays of the local economy had been the shipping which in huge 
numbers had once called at the island for supplies, but not since the later 19th century; plus 
the demand generated by a resident garrison, which had been withdrawn early in the 20th 
century.  Now it was largely dependent on a low-wage flax-growing and fibre-making 
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industry, already in terminal decline.  Much of the island’s infrastructure, housing and public 
services therefore depended on recurrent budgetary aid and whatever development money the 
UK government provided.  Islanders had reason to complain, and at a public meeting prior to 
his departure Hughes was asked to advise on setting up a trade union.   
 
The St Helena General Workers Union [GWU] was formed immediately, in July 1958.  Fred 
Ward, then aged 42, became its charismatic, energetic and, to be frank, intemperate general 
secretary. Like many Saints he was of mixed race origins, but his aspirations for islanders had 
been unusually sharpened off-island by wartime service in the South African military, travel 
worldwide in the merchant navy, and employment in South African goldmines.  He returned 
to St Helena in 1953, opened a shop with his wife, and began to use the (government-edited) 
press to attack what he saw as government maladministration.14  The GWU public meetings 
he now addressed, the protest marches he headed, and the strikes (and New Year’s Eve 
dances) he organised attracted such support that by July 1959 the union claimed a 
membership of 2025, or ‘most of the entire employed population’, including not just men and 
women employed in the flax industry, but wharf workers, general labourers, low grade 
government employees, and even, it was said, housewives.15  Here at last was the voice of the 
people, or at least The Voice of the Union as its highly polemical and occasionally libellous 
campaigning newsletter, entirely written by Ward, was called.  His complaints about the 
colonial government were addressed to the Colonial Office, TUC, ICFTU and of course 
Hughes.  Crucially, Ward insisted that democratic representation was essential if living 
standards were to be raised.  He demanded at the very least a wholly elected Advisory 
Council.16   
 
In the context of political demands elsewhere this was not extreme nor might its origins seem 
remarkable. By 1958, trade unions were widespread in British colonial territories, and 
agitation over terms and conditions of labour and demands for social improvements were 
often coupled with pressure for political reform and sometimes linked to nationalist 
movements.17  But what had developed in large colonies in Africa and in such territorially 
small but densely populated colonies as Singapore, Hong Kong, Aden, Gibraltar and in the 
West Indies seemed astonishing when tiny and seemingly docile St Helena erupted.  True, the 
Colonial Office, primed by Robert Alford, the new governor who had arrived in February 
1958, was aware that Saints were not so saintly as to be insensitive to low pay, poor housing 
and rising unemployment,18 but organised discontent was such a shock that a senior official 
from the Colonial Office (Aaron Emanuel, an LSE-trained economist) was dispatched in 
March 1959 on an almost unprecedented visit to the island.  He was struck by the strength of 
feeling, the legitimacy of local concerns and the risk of public disorder.  In agitated telegrams 
and in his subsequent report he recommended immediate relief measures, action to address 
economic decline, investment in public services and further constitutional change as 
necessary responses to what seemed serious problems.19   
 
The pressure on Governor Alford from the GWU was such that in July 1959, after a year of 
agitation, he too albeit reluctantly was ready to accept, with the inclusion of two ex officio 
members, an otherwise wholly elected Advisory Council.  But opinion was divided in the 
Colonial Office, where the constitutions of other small colonies were examined and 
compared, and Alford also changed his mind, but it was only opposition from almost all the 
unofficial members of the current Executive and Advisory Councils (largely the island’s few 
well-to-do employers) which instead caused the secretary of state in July 1960 after a further 
year of deliberation to insist that only half the sixteen members of an enlarged Advisory 
Council should be elected while four non-officials (and four officials) should still be 
 5 
nominated by the governor, supposedly to give voice to ‘minority opinion’.  Moreover, 
pending the drafting of a new constitution, another Advisory Council as currently composed 
was appointed, possibly for a further three years while the new system was put in place. This 
limited concession and its delayed implementation were denounced by Ward, still insisting, at 
once, on an entirely elected Advisory Council.  Attempts by Alford to rally local opinion 
behind the official proposals also failed to catch fire, and with relations between union and 
governor so bitter during 1961 no settlement had been reached and no election held (partly 
because the Colonial Office feared a boycott) before his term of office was concluded.20  On 
2 March 1962 Alford left the island.   
 
In drawing up what were in effect a ‘job description’ and a ‘person specification’ for his 
successor, it was now recognised in the Colonial Office that someone special was needed to 
fill the post since ‘St Helena is no longer an easy and restful place, and there is considerable 
discontent to a large extent but not wholly stirred up by one or two local “agitators” who may 
prove troublesome’.21  John Field’s Colonial Service career went back to 1936 and his 
appointment, aged 23, as a cadet administrative officer in Nigeria, by when political 
challenges were already altering the politics of the Colonial Empire. His sensitivity to risks 
and needs was sharpened by his subsequent service as senior assistant secretary responsible 
for security and defence matters in the colony’s secretariat in Lagos from the late 1940s to 
1953, during which period a largely unitary constitution was devised and launched in 1947 
but revised in 1951. Then, appointed in 1953 as a senior district officer and later resident in 
Nigeria’s Eastern Region, he was confronted by regional objections to a centralised state.  
Recalled to Lagos as principal assistant secretary and then deputy chief secretary, he became 
involved instead in drafting and launching Nigeria’s 1954 federal constitution, after which as 
UK commissioner (in effect governor) for the UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons 
from 1956 he was engaged in the local and London conferences which culminated in 
Nigerian independence in 1960.  In these senior roles Field worked with African elected 
ministers and officials.  Also, as commissioner and therefore frequently in New York as a 
special UK representative on the UN’s Trusteeship Council, he was made still more acutely 
aware of which way the political wind was blowing. Since in 1961 he had conducted a 
plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons to determine its future by popular vote (to become part 
of Nigeria or join the Federal Republic of Cameroon), he also knew a thing or two about 
ballot boxes.  Indeed, Field’s handling of constitutional matters counted much in his favour, 
and he was judged pretty unanimously by senior Colonial Office staff as the most suitable out 
of the half dozen candidates considered for the post. Field himself acknowledged the value of 
his experiences in West Africa for his programme for change on St Helena, for ‘there was 
practically no form of constitutional development or civic machinery that we did not have to 
cope with’.  And so, having been responsible in Africa for the well-being and political future 
of very large populations across huge spaces, for which he acquired his knighthood, Sir John 
was now to govern a few thousand people on an island in the south Atlantic apparently in a 
state of unrest.22   
 
Field had been briefed at the Colonial Office before he set off, and also by the TUC and in a 
meeting with Cledwyn Hughes, so he had a pretty shrewd idea about the situation he would 
find.23  But his immediate task had been made easier because Ward had at last agreed to 
compromise on the constitutional reforms which had so long been stalled.24  Since the dispute 
between GWU and governor had become a highly personalised confrontation (as issues of the 
Voice of the Union only too sharply reveal and as Alford recognised),25 it was the departure 
of Governor Alford which at last allowed Ward to accept the advice which Cledwyn Hughes 
had repeatedly pressed upon him - personally when Ward late in 1959 had been in London 
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attending a trade union training course (paid for by the TUC) and thereafter in letters over the 
following years which Hughes had despatched to St Helena.  George Woodcock, General 
Secretary of the TUC, had similarly urged Ward to think carefully about his stubborn 
opposition to the constitutional changes on offer lest it damage the union’s other 
campaigns.26  There were also signs during 1961 that popular interest in constitutional reform 
was on the ebb, a sign of things to come, and such a shift may also have persuaded Ward to 
secure what was on offer.27 The governor would still appoint half the members of the 
Advisory Council - four officials and four non-officials - but the other eight were to be 
democratically elected, one from each of eight constituencies.  In addition, while all seven 
members of the Executive Council were still to be appointed by the governor, they were to 
include three of the non-officials serving on the Advisory Council, and, as a concession to the 
GWU, one of them had to be an elected member – a proposal which Field himself had 
volunteered at his briefing in the Colonial Office.28  Grass roots pressure had had some 
effect.  It was now for Field to introduce these changes.   
 
Over the next six years, he was to be responsible for many more.  Considering what was 
happening elsewhere in the colonial world, one might expect Governor Field to be driven 
further forward by the heated demands of a politicised public, led by a GWU ratcheting up its 
requirements.  In fact, much of the subsequent democratisation of St Helena was top down, 
engineered by a governor convinced by experience that the local population needed to be 
taught democratic practice and educated in democratic responsibilities.  Field had concluded 
from his dealings with the UN that unless constitutional changes were made, and soon, the 
UN’s Committee of Twenty-Four would ‘start sticking their oar in and making a nuisance of 
themselves’. This, more politely expressed, was the motive for change he set down for the 
Colonial Office in December 1962 in response to an enquiry about political futures addressed 
to the governors of all the ‘smaller colonial territories’.  St Helena, in free association with 
the UK, should become as much as possible internally self-governing, with a Legislative 
Council elected by adult suffrage; the governor would retain reserved powers but otherwise 
should be bound to act on the advice of an Executive Council composed mainly of members 
of the Legislative Council elected by their colleagues.  Here indeed was ambition, laid down 
early, and ahead of the game.  But, he concluded, ‘The speed at which these changes could be 
introduced would depend on how long it took to overcome the apathy of the people but the 




The immediate need was to establish and operate St Helena’s partially-elected Advisory 
Council.  Only a few expat settlers and officials, and maybe some Saints who had lived 
abroad, would have had experience of a general election.  During his period as governor, 
Field organised two, plus four by-elections, and always he found it hard work to generate 
public involvement.  His efforts included using the government-run newspapers, the weekly 
St Helena News Review and the monthly St Helena Wirebird, to inform, instruct and enthuse.  
Prior to St Helena’s first election in September 1963, he explained how elections were 
conducted, how to register as voters, how to get nominated as candidates, and why all this 
mattered.  This may seem elementary stuff, but as he wrote, with reasonable accuracy, it was 
necessary ‘since nobody has any idea what the election is all about and seem to think it can 
all be done by a show of hands at some sort of public meeting’.  He also addressed well-
publicised meetings around the island to explain and encourage, even showing films of 
polling days elsewhere by way of illustration.30   
 
 7 
The registration of voters would be the first test of whether these efforts to generate political 
involvement had been effective. Voters had to be British subjects, aged 21 or over, and 
ordinarily resident in St Helena for at least a year before registration.  Registration forms 
were made available from offices and shops throughout the island and in copies of the News 
Review, which like the Wirebird also urged readers, repeatedly, to register.  The response was 
underwhelming.  After two weeks only 330 people had registered, after a month just over 
800, out of a potential electorate of 2000 or so.  Not satisfied with the number netted, Field 
extended the registration period, but the final figure of 969 at the end of July 1963 was ‘still 
small compared with the number of people on the island eligible for registration’,31 and 
indeed less than half of the reported membership of the GWU in 1959. 
 
Persuading candidates to stand generated additional challenges.  Field knew whom he wanted 
on the new Advisory Council.  He was aware that the four official members to be appointed 
would be from overseas, and probably one of the four non-officials he was required to 
nominate.  Those five among sixteen councillors were, he reckoned, a ‘large enough 
proportion’.  By implication, the others and certainly the eight to be elected should be local 
folk: ‘My job was to try to make St Helenians take an interest in public affairs and speak for 
themselves’.  With such political instincts in mind, he used the government press to stress the 
importance to islanders of the Advisory Council’s business and to urge candidates, including 
women, to come forward.  Perhaps as a result, and contrary to Field’s fears, there were 
nineteen nominations, including three women.  However, there would be elections in only six 
of the eight constituencies since only one candidate had been persuaded to stand in each of 
the other two.  He concluded, somewhat ruefully, that on the whole ‘the candidates are not a 
bad lot and it is encouraging that so many people are prepared to stand after all’.  But he was 
irritated that the bishop of St Helena, British-born and a former Royal Navy chaplain, had 
declared his intention to stand for election and could not be dissuaded.  
 
Registered voters still had to turn out and vote.  Field had micro-managed the preparations, 
ensuring that constituency boundaries had been defined and publicised, voting papers had 
been printed, ballot boxes constructed, polling stations prepared and election officers 
rehearsed in their duties, and the electorate had been reassured that their votes would remain 
secret.  ‘Everything is now in your hands … and it simply remains for YOU to complete the 
last stage of St Helena’s first elections by going to the poll and casting your vote.  Having 
done this you can truthfully say that you have done your part to help ST HELENA along the 
path of political development.’32  He was anxious, but in fact the overall turn-out in contested 
seats was good, though, given the modest number of people who had registered, the votes 
cast in each contested constituency were still few, ranging from 64 to 192.  Obviously, he 
wished that more islanders had registered and then voted and that all seats had been 
contested, but it was still ‘a real historic day for St Helena’ because it was ‘the first occasion 
in the long history of the island that elections were held to give the people an opportunity to 
elect eight candidates to the new Advisory Council’, albeit to sit alongside eight others he 
would nominate.33   
 
Moreover, and this pleased him, all but one of those elected were St Helenians.  Two were 
employees of Cable and Wireless Ltd, two were housewives, and the others a foreman in a 
flax mill, a small farmer, and a self-employed carpenter and boat builder.  Only a couple of 
candidates, one of whom was elected, had explicit GWU associations, but this was an 
election contested not by organised parties but by individuals, voted for by neighbours, 
perhaps based primarily on personality and current public standing.  But the election of the 
bishop scuppered Field’s plan to invite the eight elected members themselves to choose the 
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one elected member of the Advisory Council who would also sit on the Executive Council.  
Field was certain that the bishop would see to it that his seven colleagues would propose 
himself, and because Field was determined to keep him off the Executive Council he was 
forced to restrain his democratic instincts, stick to an old regime practice of the governor 
making the selection, and thereby secure another authentic St Helenian on that council, a self-
employed farmer who ‘therefore should [be] independent’, a man ‘with ideas of his own, 
which is what we want’.  A constitution combining popular democracy with his continuing 
right to exercise gubernatorial authority ensured that eleven of the sixteen members of the 
new Advisory Council were Saints, as were the three non-official representatives of that 
council on his Executive Council. 
  
The old Advisory Council had met with the governor in private in the Castle, the 
administrative seat of government, but this was incompatible with Field’s democratic 
principles, so it was not merely for convenience that meetings of the new and enlarged 
Advisory Council were held in public in the Supreme Court building.  Its location in 
Jamestown’s main square was more likely, he judged, to persuade people to drop in and see 
democratic debate in action, and he used the News Review to publicise council meetings and 
encourage attendance, and subsequently to report on matters discussed at council meetings.  
In his opening address to the first meeting on 16 October 1963, he also pressed the 
democratic button by stressing that elected councillors were ‘accountable, not to the 
Governor or to themselves, but to the people who elected them’.  Meetings were therefore 
open ‘as it was the right of the public to know how the Council was dealing with their 
affairs’.  It would have pleased him to see about fifty attending that inaugural event.34  
 
However, while several overseas people came to listen at a subsequent Advisory Council 
meeting in June 1965, only one St Helenian was present.   Because council sessions had been 
held in the morning when, perhaps, ‘the younger and more alert St Helenians were at work’, 
he arranged for the next meeting to be in the evening ‘in the hope that it would provide a 
better opportunity for more people to listen’.  But evenings are dark all the year round in St 
Helena and the Supreme Court building lacked adequate lights, ‘and there may not be any 
spare money to get them put in’.  Getting St Helena’s democracy to shine more brightly 
encountered peculiar difficulties.  However, the lights must have been fixed, because so many 
turned up to the evening meeting in September 1965 that all the seats were taken and the 
overflow had to stand at the door.  But Field suspected it was only the proposal under 
discussion to allow government tenants to buy their houses that had attracted so many.  He 
was right to be sceptical.  When council next met, to consider the annual budget, town and 
country planning legislation, and making women eligible for jury service, only a dozen 
people came to listen.35  Once the novelty had worn off, public interest largely evaporated. 
 
If council meetings were to retain an audience and be constructive, councillors needed to 
engage in democratic debate in public.  At the inaugural meeting Field had stressed that the 
role of councillors was to advise the governor on all internal matters upon which he sought 
advice, including draft legislation, but also that constructive criticism of government was 
‘salutary and a perfectly good and legitimate way of tendering advice’.  Moreover, council 
did not have to speak with one voice, and councillors should also bring up other issues as 
they saw fit.36  His aim from the beginning was clear.  He intended ‘to run the Council on 
parliamentary lines with a view to turning it as soon as possible into a proper legislative 
council’. That meant following agreed rules of procedure, for which he adopted those he had 
drawn up for the advisory council of chiefs in Southern Cameroons.  He acknowledged in his 
journal after that first meeting that several councillors had contributed to discussions on one 
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item of business, a road traffic ordinance, but after meetings in November 1963 he could only 
record that he was ‘not too dissatisfied since members are still feeling their way’.  In May 
1964, one councillor proposed a private member’s bill and others put down questions, like 
backbench MPs at Westminster, which he as governor after consulting departmental heads 
was obliged to answer, but there was little debate and business was dispatched in an hour.  
Even after a better meeting in November 1964, Field still felt that councillors ‘have very far 
to go before they even begin to be a little parliament’.  Councillors too were conscious of 
their inexperience, so at their request he staged mock debates and instructed them in how to 
deal with an amendment to a resolution, the procedure to follow when a division was called, 
and how to bring up supplementary questions in response to an official answer to a tabled 
question.  He conceded that councillors learnt from the exercises, but they still ‘did not 
debate very well’.  He had nagging doubts as to whether they would ever be able to operate 
any sort of parliamentary system.  What mattered was that ‘they should discuss public affairs 
publicly and have the courage to come out into the open with their views, and that is what 
they are most reluctant to do’. This was a continuing problem. The Advisory Council meeting 
in June 1965 was ‘very depressing’.  There were eight draft bills to consider, but ‘nobody 
spoke a word’ and the entire business was disposed of in two hours, leaving Field to wonder 




The reformed Advisory Council had not been a success.  Elected members may have done 
useful work, looking after the interests of their constituents by raising issues with the heads of 
government departments, as Field had urged, but public involvement in elections had been 
limited, attendance at council meetings was patchy, and the quality of debates generally poor.  
Perhaps this was partly because meetings of the Advisory Council were irregular and 
infrequent, only four times from October 1963 to June 1965, whereas the Executive Council 
met at least eight times in 1964 and ten times in 1965.37  But the real problem, as Field saw it, 
was that the Advisory Council had few responsibilities because it was not intimately involved 
in the regular administration of the colony. While he discerned no demand locally for further 
constitutional reform, he still believed that change was needed if criticism from the UN were 
to be avoided.  After developing his ideas in his journal, in September 1965 he put proposals 
to the Colonial Office which, he hoped, would more effectively advance democratic self-
government.   
 
He had to hand a model of his own invention.  At the inaugural meeting of the Advisory 
Council in 1963, he had mentioned that some business might be dealt with by ad hoc 
committees made up of councillors plus others with requisite technical expertise.  A 
development committee and a housing committee had indeed been formed to examine 
schemes and recommend priorities for funding.38  Field now contemplated setting up 
similarly composed standing committees and charging them with responsibility for ‘the 
general oversight and supervision of departmental activities’. They might also take over the 
duties of several statutory bodies which scarcely functioned because, individually, they had 
so little to do.  The committees would not be involved in the detailed running of departments 
and would not be responsible for staffing matters, but such a system would give councillors 
‘something specific to do’ since a great deal of administrative business would be their 
concern.  He also wanted the Advisory Council to be retitled the Legislative Council in 
recognition of councillors’ responsibilities and to enhance its status.  All he asked was that he 
should be authorised to carry out informal consultations, which the Colonial Office, after 
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rattling around among precedents and dwelling on possible implications and without 
commitment, was pleased to grant.39   
 
The surprisingly enthusiastic responses Field then received from those whose views he 
respected emboldened him to press ahead with further recommendations that he had 
originally thought might only be rolled out later.  First, chairs of the Legislative Council 
committees should at once be brought into the administrative heart of colonial government by 
making them members of the Executive Council, and, second, after the life of the current 
Advisory and soon to become Legislative Council expired in October 1967 and before the 
next general election, two of its four nominated official members should be removed and all 
four of its nominated unofficial members replaced by four more elected councillors, to create 
a LegCo made up of twelve elected and just two ex officio members.40    
 
In May 1966, the Colonial Office gave its initial blessing, then finally and formally in 
September; and while officials set about drafting new statutory instruments,41 Field selected 
members of the current Advisory Council to chair his new Legislative Council committees 
(and thereby become members of his new Executive Council).  But the appointment of other 
committee members, including people with technical knowledge who were not councillors, 
he devolved on to a selection committee of two council members who were islanders, plus 
the government secretary.  Field was determined to devolve responsibilities, even this one, on 
to St Helenians.  He also explained to the heads of government departments how, under the 
new constitution, they needed to work closely with the new committees and especially to 
keep their chairs fully informed of what was ‘going on’.  With appointments made, teams 
briefed, standing orders drawn up and with perhaps a sigh of relief, Field wrote that ‘it should 
now be possible to bring the new Constitution into force on 1st January, 1967’.  It was.   
 
But it was still a worry that in June 1966 he had secured the formal agreement of the 
Advisory Council to his constitutional innovations not only ‘without a hitch’ but indeed on 
this and other matters with practically no debate, ‘as usual’.  Moreover, at two by-elections in 
September 1966 and in spite of much urging in the press, only one candidate came forward in 
one constituency, and while two stood at the other only 39 votes were cast (84 in 1963), 
hardly indicating ‘any particular enthusiasm for the parliamentary system or democratic 
processes’.  Nor was he pleased in October 1966 when ‘practically nothing was said’ at the 
next and indeed final meeting of his Advisory Council.  He could only hope that his 
constitutional reforms would gee things up, ‘otherwise there is a poor look out for any sort of 
constitutional advance in St Helena’.  After the formal opening on 17 January 1967 of the 
first Legislative Council, he was better pleased by a brisk debate on the draft budget, and he 
recorded later that the LegCo committees had ‘got off to a gratifyingly good start’ and were 
‘tending to probe into government policies and activities and by no means take everything 
officials tell them on trust. That is as it should be’.42  But in September 1967, at a council by-
election and after much urging in the government press, there was only one candidate, 
returned unopposed, and he was not a Saint but an expat.  It filled Field with foreboding: ‘I 
hope some good may yet come out of it by bringing home to the people’, by which term he 
always meant true St Helenians, ‘that if they don’t take the trouble to field candidates of their 
own, they stand the risk of having their affairs run for them by overseas people.’  He felt the 
constitution he had designed was sound, ‘but there is still the risk that the whole lot will fall 
down because not enough people will stand for election.  I shall be sadly disappointed if that 
happens’.   
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He was to be disappointed.  St Helena’s first general election in 1963 had been to elect eight 
candidates to make up half (only) of an Advisory Council (only).  The general election 
scheduled for February 1968 was to elect twelve members of a Legislative Council who 
would also serve on committees supervising government business, including those who as 
committee chairs would become members of the governor’s Executive Council.  The 
democratic responsibilities of islanders had been considerably increased.  Once more the 
government publicity operation swung into action, but by mid-November the response had 
been so poor that the public were warned that in only two constituencies were there even 
enough registered voters to nominate a candidate.  More registration forms were distributed 
and another warning about low numbers issued. ‘It is very depressing’, Field recorded. ‘We 
can but battle on, in the hope that people will slowly become alive to the need to assume 
some sort of political responsibility.’  The new bishop of St Helena and the current general 
secretary of the GWU also urged folk to register.  But even with that boost, by 1 December 
1967 the total amounted to only 598, less than a quarter of the adult population.  Further 
efforts had by late January pushed the figure up to 653, but still substantially fewer than even 
the modest total in 1963.43  It was ‘not good’, though there were, at least, enough registered 
voters in each constituency to hold an election and enough to nominate candidates, if any 
came forward.   
 
Late in December, Field knew of only six people willing to stand, but there were twelve seats 
to fill.  The government publicity machine was cranked up again, urging more to volunteer.  
He even made it possible for someone to stand by bringing forward his date for retirement 
from government service, only to Field’s dismay for this prospective candidate to say he was 
willing to be appointed to a council committee but not to stand for election.  By early 
February 1968, it was still doubtful whether there would be enough candidates returned for 
him to be able to find chairs for the LegCo committees and thereby acquire the six members 
required to stock the Executive Council.  In the event, there were no nominations for two of 
the twelve seats and only one candidate for each of the other ten, to be returned unopposed.44  
There would be no contested Legislative Council elections in 1968.  Democracy in St Helena 
still had shallow roots.   
 
Field took some solace from the complexion of the ten candidates who had been returned.  
Numerically there were enough to serve as chairs of the LegCo committees and therefore 
enough to serve on the Executive Council and ‘keep the Constitution working, which is better 
than I at one time feared’.  Six had been members of the previous council, of whom he rated 
three as ‘good men’, and he thought that with experience two of the novices could also be 
good, and a third possibly useful ‘if he doesn’t prove a thorn in the flesh’.  He kept his 
assessment of the remaining four even off the pages of his journal.  ‘It could have been a 
better council, but it might have been a great deal worse.’  But to ensure that suitable persons 
would chair the council’s committees and accordingly join his Executive Council, Field 
waited on the return after another uncontested by-election of an experienced councillor who 
regretted that he had not stood again at the general election.  For Field, and for good 
government, it seemed worth the wait.  He was also pleased to appoint as a chair one of the 
two women councillors elected, since this would also bring a woman on to the island’s 
Executive Council, an appointment without precedent and perhaps, Field suspected with 
some pleasure, the first woman to serve on an Executive Council in any British colony.  And, 
as another ‘first’, he was able to bequeath to his successor as governor ‘an all-St Helenian 
ExCo’, except for the two ex officio members.  It was a landmark, and ‘good from the point 
of view of getting Islanders to take responsibility for their own affairs’. 
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The new Legislative Council first met on 26 March 1968.  After the necessary formalities, Sir 
John addressed the members.  It would be his last such occasion.  He stressed the high 
importance of their committee work, and therefore urged them to arrange committee 
meetings outside normal working hours so that all members, especially those with contracted 
hours of employment, could attend.  Moreover, because democratically elected 
representatives were answerable to the public, they should use the News Review and the 
government’s radio broadcasting service (launched on Christmas Day 1967) to keep the 
public ‘fully and accurately informed’ of what they were doing.  The new constitution was 
only one step, but a big one, towards ‘the people of the Island assuming full responsibility for 
ordering their own affairs’.  Their task was to develop it ‘into a true “government of the 
people, by the people, for the people” of this island’.45   After that ringing peroration, Field 
that evening hosted a dinner party for councillors, which ‘went very well’.  As did the first 
and for Field his only meeting of the newly constituted Executive Council.  He could not 
resist again mentioning in his journal that this was the first made up entirely of St Helenians, 
including a woman, with only a couple of ex officio chaps in attendance.  The business in 




By the time Sir John Field left St Helena in May 1968 he had largely completed the 
constitutional agenda he had set himself on arrival.  He had given Saints their first taste of 
democratic government; the half-elected Advisory Council he had inaugurated in 1963 had 
become an almost wholly elected Legislative Council; elected members sat on committees 
responsible for government business; and islanders as chairs of those committees served 
alongside just two senior expat officials in an Executive Council presided over by the 
governor.  Field was gratified to learn when on leave in London in 1967 that ‘my new 
constitution for St Helena was exciting interest as a model for other small colonies’.  He also 
told Commonwealth Office staff in June 1968, when reviewing his time as governor, that he 
was ‘very satisfied’ with the way the new constitution and the LegCo committees were 
working and that Saints were beginning to take an interest in their activities.46 
 
And yet when he summed up his achievements privately in his journal he thought he had not 
‘done so very much’, except improve wages, start a children’s home and provide better 
housing.  Interestingly, these are examples of top-down ‘good government’ rather than of 
constitution-making and ‘self-government’ to which he had dedicated much thought and 
energy, and which one might regard as his more far-reaching legacy.  Today’s Legislative 
Council, its committees, and the Executive Council are derived from Field’s innovations, 
though since 1988 the chairs of council committees have not been chosen by the governor but 
elected by LegCo members, as Field had indeed anticipated.47  Possibly in his mind was his 
disappointment at how hard it had been to introduce not so much democratic structures as 
democratic participation.  He had after all been brought in as governor when the demand for 
radical democratic reform seemed to threaten a breakdown in government, and yet he was 
soon recording the political apathy of most islanders, as had his predecessors and indeed as 
did his successors in office.  In LegCo general elections in 1972 two seats were uncontested 
(and five filled by expatriates) and four in 1976; nine unopposed candidates were returned in 
1980 and no nominations for the other three seats; and in 1984 four candidates were 
unopposed.48 
   
What had not been sustained was the political agitation which had preceded his appointment 
as governor.  The GWU had certainly shaken up St Helena, but officials in Jamestown and in 
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London had always suspected that huge membership numbers, public demonstrations and the 
apparently popular demand for constitutional change owed much to Fred Ward’s leadership.  
In fact, when they met, Field was soon persuaded that Ward was not a ‘South Atlantic Fidel 
Castro’, as some expat settlers implied, but a local man looking for ‘a legitimate outlet for his 
undoubted ability’.  Ward too was frustrated in his role of agitator, and in need of gainful 
employment.  In October 1962 he applied for the vacant government post of Social Welfare 
Officer, in which role he believed (correctly, as it turned out) he could do good by addressing 
some of St Helena’s social problems.  Field’s decision to appoint him was not a cunning plan 
to muzzle a troublemaker, for he had hoped Ward ‘would stand for election and come on the 
Executive Council where he would be a useful and lively member’; but he was ‘incomparably 
the strongest candidate’ for the job.49  Unfortunately, Ward attempted to retain some 
authority over the GWU, and the consequences were bitter public disputes with the new 
leadership and a fall in membership.  Remarkably, a delegation from the GWU in July 1965, 
which met two MPs on an official visit, had several criticisms of government policies and 
practices but raised no complaints about the constitution, this when there was still only a half-
elected Advisory Council.  It was left to one of the visitors to urge St Helenians to ‘take more 
responsibility in the conduct of Government’.50 The union partly recovered its support and 
canvassed at elections in favour of GWU members, and after the 1972 general election those 
returned labelled themselves the St Helena Progressive Party.  But though they were active as 
councillors, and the union lobbied hard on issues concerning the economy and social welfare, 
its mass appeal diminished, and the union itself, like the party, evaporated.51  What Field had 
feared occurred.  Without Ward, popular engagement in democratic politics became harder to 
sustain. 
 
Colonial regulations operating in St Helena, as elsewhere, may have compounded the 
problem because they barred people holding ‘offices of profit under the Crown’ from serving 
as elected members.  Those employed by the government, even in humble capacities, had to 
resign their posts to serve as councillors, or resign as councillors if taking up a government 
job.  Field regretted a restriction which ‘cuts out some of the best potential material’. It was 
particularly inhibiting because the proportion of the employed population working in the 
private sector fell when, for instance, the decline in the flax and fibre industry and related 
occupations accelerated, at the same time that public sector employment increased as 
government services grew.52 Moreover, serving as a councillor was voluntary work. It took 
up time, more so when Field’s creation of LegCo committees obliged councillors to get more 
involved in administration and meet frequently.  There were financial costs too, especially for 
the chairs of committees because they had further obligations as members of the governor’s 
Executive Council.  This was something Field managed only marginally to address: 
councillors received a modest allowance to cover expenses and loss of earnings while on 
government business, but they were not paid, though Field thought they should be.53  
Moreover, a population of fewer than 2500 adults was no more likely to have spawned 
politically determined islanders with time to spare from the gruelling business of earning a 
living than an equivalent sized community in Britain, where local elections are often 
characterised by uncontested seats and low turn-outs.   
However, politics in St Helena probably also suffered from the loss of population overseas. 
(Hence, until recent decades, pretty much the stability of the island’s post-war resident 
population in spite of natural increase). Until apartheid rules kicked in and excluded them, 
many islanders had left to work or even to settle in South Africa.  Thereafter, increasing 
numbers of Saints worked on Ascension, numbering 403 in 1966, equivalent to a quarter of 
the employed labour force on St Helena.  Many more migrated to the UK, some 1500 in 
‘recent years’ it was reckoned in 1965, until the 1981 British Nationality Act made it much 
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more difficult for those defined as citizens of ‘the dependent territories’, like St Helenians, to 
secure rights of residence.54  Moreover, while those otherwise qualified and registered in St 
Helena but temporarily off island could vote, by proxy, there is no indication that they did.55  
It is also probable that many of those who left the island, temporarily or permanently, were 
among the more enterprising and also those who had derived most from an educational 
system generally regarded as poor by UK standards. Certainly, islanders had always had to go 
overseas for further education and technical training. Not surprisingly, many so geared up did 
not return, and some whose funding required them to return (particularly teachers) did not 
permanently stay – because pay and prospects seemed brighter off-island.56  It would be an 
exaggeration to state that political involvement and political skills depend on high levels of 
formal education, but considering the role played by university graduates and skilled workers 
in, for instance, anti-colonial movements in Africa, the West Indies and elsewhere, it is 
probable that St Helena’s politics were inhibited by their absence.  
 
Cultural features were also less provocative of political agitation than elsewhere in the 
colonial empire. St Helena had been innocent of sustained human settlement until the East 
India Company arrived in 1659, and so there was no indigenous culture or ‘native’ form of 
self-government, particularly at local level, with which colonial rulers could or must engage 
and which elsewhere in empire provided a voice for the governed – as indeed Field had 
encountered earlier in his career in West Africa and as he would meet again in the South 
Pacific.57 What had developed in St Helena was a remarkably interbred population of mixed 
ethnic including European origins, almost all locally born. While some white settlers and 
expat government officials were occasionally accused of racial prejudice, interestingly by 
Fred Ward who was sensitive to racism having worked in South Africa,58 there was nothing 
as provocative as an overt colour bar.  In 1962, seven of the administration’s twenty-one 
senior officials and all other government posts were held by islanders,59 and subsequently 
Field was to recruit still more (including his ADC in 1966). In fact, a monolingual English 
and intensely British culture emerged, devoted to British sports and youth movements, keen 
on pubs and clubs, enthusiastically loyal to the crown, and overwhelmingly Church of 
England but tolerant of other faiths.60  Noticeably neither church nor chapel became 
politicised institutions, as happened in other societies, and not just in British colonies.61  
Hughes in his report suggested that political passivity was due to the slave roots (in the East 
India Company period) of many in the population.  But paradoxically it may have been the 
very Britishness of St Helena which induced a passive toleration of British colonial rule. 
That passivity may even have been a result of Governor Field’s efforts to generate its 
opposite.  His constitutional reforms probably reduced such political discontent as Ward had 
once managed to mobilise: inaction would surely have provoked a resentful reaction.  
Moreover, Field had also endeavoured to erode the space, endemic in colonies, between 
himself and senior expat officials on the one hand and local people on the other. ‘There is 
without doubt a gulf between the Castle and the people’, and it was ‘most important that it 
should be bridged’.  Not least for political reasons, he had made social contacts beyond the 
few members of the well-to-do elite.  Hence, for example, his attendance at GWU sports days 
and dances, his engagement as Chief Scout with youth movements, his reading of the lesson 
at Sunday services in the island’s churches, the lavish hospitality (much at his own expense) 
which brought islanders to Plantation House (the governor’s residence) in unprecedented 
numbers, and the drinks parties he arranged in outlying communities so he could ‘mix among 
more St Helenians’. 
 
Moreover, while visitors were always disturbed by standards of living on St Helena which 
fell some way below UK expectations, this was not such a hierarchical society of wealth and 
 15 
status that relative deprivation internally was sufficient to provoke political protest.  Even that 
limited sense of ‘missing out’ on something better, of which returned migrants might have 
been aware, was otherwise contained by the island’s extraordinary physical isolation and 
until recently limited telecommunications contacts with the outside world.  Not surprisingly, 
then, some of those who did take up political causes were expats, but only 85 were so 
classified in the 1987 census, and nearly all worked for government.  In any case, some 
benefits of colonial rule were being felt, even while the economy struggled.  Field, for 
example, offset the decline in the flax and fibre industry by relief works, more government 
employment (and at rates of pay which set higher standards in the private sector), price 
subsidies and improvements in the island’s housing, health, education and other services.62   
 
All this was to the good, but these and later developments were invariably top-down reforms, 
often designed by external consultants, governors and ex pat officers with the input and 
approval of officials and ministers in London. Islanders, and even elected councillors, were 
induced to receive passively top-down policies in whose formulation they had scarcely been 
involved.63  Moreover, little of this expenditure was derived from locally-raised resources.  
Had St Helena itself been able to generate substantial revenues for government to tax, by 
attracting inward investment and boosting external trade, there would more likely have been 
intense political debate about how much should be raised and by what means and from 
whom, to fund which investments or services and for whom.64  As it was, governors alone 
had to negotiate with the UK government to secure annual grants-in-aid upon which, in 
increasingly large amounts, St Helena has been dependent in almost every year since 1907, 
just to meet recurrent budgetary costs.  Similarly, local debates over development fund 
expenditure were constrained, as for other dependent territories, by the island’s allocation 
which was largely settled, also in increasing amounts, by the Colonial Office and its 
successors in negotiation with the Treasury.65 In sum, financial dependence discouraged local 
initiatives, inhibited local argument about policies and priorities, and generated what might 
best be described as a grumbling but passive dependency culture.66  As Field himself 
acknowledged, the business of government, with which Saints were urged to engage, was 
therefore largely about day-to-day administration and not the high profile policy matters 
which raised political temperatures in other places.  If financial independence stimulates self-
government, more than vice versa, at least initially, then it is less of a surprise that a culture 
of political involvement was hard to generate and sustain in St Helena.  An airport, 
constructed at huge expense to the UK government, is scheduled to open in 2016, and some 
public utilities are being privatised.67  It remains to be seen whether this will pull in private 
investors, boost the island economically through tourism, make the government financially 
self-sufficient, suggest independence at last as an option, or at least further engage the public 
in the democratic politics that Sir John Field had been so keen to encourage.  
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